Summary
The work is dedicated to the art of war of the Bulgarian Army after the Liberation (1878) till the end of the Second World War. During this period the Army participates in three regional and two world wars. Exactly these wars are object of the research, because only on the battlefield the standard of the attained military and theoretical achievements and also the practical degree of commanders’, staffs’ and troops’ preparation to fight and win are obvious.
The Third Bulgarian State and its Armed Forces come into being and develop with certain backwardness in the time. During the second half of the 19th century new means of destruction are introduced in the Armies of the European countries, a theory of their use is elaborated. New organizational units in the troops, types and devices for conducting the war, campaign and combat are also verified. In this sense the Bulgarian Army has quickly to gain on and if it is possible to outstrip its future eventual enemies or allies. Depending on the Bulgaria’s foreignpolitical orientation, during the different periods our army is under the influence of the Russian or the West-European military and theoretical thought. The talented Bulgarian military leaders succeed not only to acquire the alien experience and to adapt it to the specific conditions, but also to contribute to the enrichment of the military art’s practice.
The research is made on the basis of the works that have been published until now and also on the archives. It aims at the further clarifying of the army’s military art. The analytical approach is applied which excludes the description of the operations, battles and combats. Examples of them are used only for confirming some of the conclusions that have been made earlier.
The monograph is worked out into three chapters. The first one is dedicated to the strategic actions during the wars, reduced to the deployment of the Armed Forces, training and conducting of the strategic defence and assault. Some problems of the strategic control over the military actions are revealed for more completeness.
The three elements of the strategic deployment are showed in the wars of the Bulgarian Army: covering of the threatened borders, army’s mobilization, concentration and deployment of the troops at the theatre of war. The practice shows its great importance and outlines some tendencies in its development.
The strategic deployment of the Armed Forces is submitted to the plan for conducting a war. The experience shows that the more detailed and duly made considerations and description for preparation and conducting of a concrete war, such as the case with the First Balkan War (1912–1913) the better is conducted the strategic deployment. All the extremely imposed alterations in the conception and grouping have an adverse effect on the deployment’s timeliness and steadiness. Much more unfavourable are the cases when there is no previously worked out plan for the war as is the case in the Serbian-Bulgarian War (1885), the Second Balkan War (1913) and the war with Germany (1944–1945). Then great difficulties are created and only the determined actions of the strategic leadership lead to deployment of the troops, in due course.
The availability of sufficient mobilization contingent of well trained commanders and active personnel and its ensurance with the needed weapons and battle technics is of a great importance for the strategic deployment. These problems are not solved well enough in our army. Thus the quantity of the mobilized army for the Serbian-Bulgarian War (108 000) is limited from the number of those who were trained to carry arms and the available officers’ staff and the staff of non-commissioned officers. And during the next wars our army is not fully ensured with the so needed commanders. In all the wars a shortage of guns, small arms, ammunitions, lubricant combustibles and materials is felt.
The communications of the country and most of all the signal and transport facilities exercise a considerable influence on the strategic deployment. The last mentioned to a considerable extent set the time limits for the strategic deployment. So if in the Serbian-Bulgarian War a whole month is needed for troops’ regrouping from the Turkish to the west border so the strategic massing of the main forces of the Bulgarian Army during the First Balkan War is carried out nearly three times faster.
The setting of the troops from peacetime to martial law is directly depending on the normative order. In 1910 in the Bulgarian army is worked out the first mobilization instruction. It requires the general rules and time limits for leading the mobilization, determines what kind of plans are being worked out from the relevant chiefs and also other requirements. During the years its improvement is on the basis of the experience from the peacetime exercises and the wars’ practice.
The experience from the military conflicts shows certain tendencies in the Armed Forces’ strategic deployment. Most generally these tendencies are brought to the shortening of the terms for its implementation, removing the limits between its compound elements and their gradual overlap, increasing the strength of the covering troops, enlargement of the spatial power of the strategic deployment and conducting the role and the significance for the successful going to war and waging a war.
There is a marked pursuit of the strategic deployment as a whole or just its main undertakings to finish before the beginning of the military actions. The experience from the Serbian-Bulgarian War shows that the late concentration and deployment force the army to conduct not equivalent defensive actions with a final alternative that is difficult to be foreseen. Nevertheless this final alternative is favourable in view of the presence of the called up troops, the heroism and self-sacrifice of the commanders and warriors. Quite favourable is the variant when the own strategic deployment outstrips that of the enemy as is the case in the First Balkan War. Then conditions are created for achieving of a sudden action and conquering of the strategic initiative.
At the end of the 19th century with the consolidation of the Bulgarian State and army the political leadership sets the task of reunification of the lands remaining outside the state’s borders. Such decisive goals can be achieved only with the help of the strategic assault and it is accepted as a main type of military actions. But the wars in the 20th century also show the regular nature of the strategic defence. It turns out that especially the prolonged military conflicts cannot only finish with assault. At a certain stage of their development not only operative pauses are imposed but also and defensive military actions.
The experience from the wars lays down three characteristic cases in which the army proceed to strategic defence: after conducting a strategic assault and seizing important regions and lines, (First Balkan War and First World War); after an unsuccessful attempt for strategic assault (Second Balkan War) in view of overtaking on the part of the enemy during the troops’ strategic deployment (Serbian-Bulgarian War).
Quite typical for the First World War is that the defence is imposed on us by the senior ally – the command authorities of the German Army. Instead of liquidating the Balkan front our army proceed to positional operations with quite obscure end. In return for it our army, in the course of three years, keeps here 35 formations of the Entente, which could not be used on the other fronts of the war.
With the exception of the First World War the goals and the tasks of the strategic defence are decisive. They are looking for repercussion of the enemy assault and creation of conditions for passing to counter-attack (Serbian-Bulgarian War) or achieving results that can have influence upon the favourable end of the war (the Two Balkan Wars).
The strategic defence is usually led for withstanding the particular operational directions and once in a great while develops into military actions on the whole or on the bigger part of the defence front. Its dependence on the operations of the particular formations and unions raises up the role of the battle for the main army line.
In the Serbian-Bulgarian War and in the First Balkan War the defence is led in a very successful way. Thus the active operations in 1885 of the covering troops at the position of Slivnitsa stop the enemy assault and create conditions for passing to counter-attack. But the assault of the Turkish troops at Chataldja (1912) is stopped in the line for ensuring and the goal of the defence is already achieved in the tactical zone.
In September 1918 the defensive actions are unsuccessful for the Bulgarian Army. In the direction of its main blow the enemy achieves breakthrough, the strategic front of the defence collapse and the failure is unavoidable. The reasons for it are complex and they have political, economic, moral and simply military character. This end of the war has already been set at the end of 1915 when positional operations are imposed on our Armed Forces. They lead defence over a front from nearly 750 km that is not taken into consideration with their capabilities. The troops of the Entente create superiority in the main direction from 2,5 up to 7:1, which predetermines their success.
Four from the five wars of the Bulgarian Army start with strategic assault. This fact has its validity in the decisive military-political goals, doctrinal opinions for the preparation and waging a war, the so created situation and other factors and circumstances that are set. Unfortunately the political and military leadership can not always choose the most advisable type of military actions.
Thus is in the Second Balkan War when our army groundlessly starts assault against its former superior allies, which quite naturally ends without a success.
The goals and the tasks of the strategic assault in the Two World Wars are taken into account and to a considerable extent are subordinated to the plans of the ally who is the leader in the coalition for conducting military actions on the Balkans. By reason of this the goals and the tasks are not always favourable for our army. Thus is in the First World War when the interests of Bulgaria are not there where the ally sends the main forces of our army (Serbia). But in 1916 the German Headquarters accept the tender and the Bulgarian Army advances towards the Dobrudja’s operational direction.
Usually the strategic assault is manifested in the form of simultaneous and consecutive operations on the front and in depth. Sometimes in this way different and insufficiently expressed means are laid down for defeating the enemy. In The First Balkan War and in The Second World War blows for destroying the particular enemy groups are stroked. In the time of assault in Dobrudja a frontal blow and enemy rejection are applied. Unfortunately the concentric blows in 1915 do not foresee and do not lead to encirclement of the Serbian troops. One of the main failings of the Bulgarian Army is the incompetence to organize and to lead a decisive pursuit of the enemy.
In two of the wars (the Serbian-Bulgarian and Second Balkan War) the strategic assault is manifested in the form of counter-attack. It is conducted in the most important directions from the theatre of war and on the rest part of the front continues the implementation of the defence. In the both cases the goals are quite decisive and lead to the achievement of good results.
Gradually in the Bulgaria’s wars is formed the strategic leadership of the army. The working bodies of the commander-in-chief are the Staff of the army in field, the main rear administration and the Ministry of War, which is independent of the General Headquarters. Usually the troops are directed throughout general instructions. Already in the wars for national reunification (1912–1918) the practice of the daily general instructions is surmounted. It turned out that they impede the initiative and the work of the subordinates and very often they are late and do not fully fit to the concrete situation. The special features of the strategic management in the coalition wars, the activity’s stage of the headquarters of the Bulgarian Army, its role in the choice of theatre of war, the creation of reserves and the troops’ ensurance are also considered in the paragraph.
At the beginning of the 20th century because of the increase of the military actions’ dimension, because of the strength of the Armed Forces and their satiety with means for armed struggle, operational units as formations for training and conducting of the operation come into view. The operational art comes into existence and its practical fundamentals are formed in the Balkan Wars (1912–1913). Therefore the second chapter is dedicated to the art in the military actions.
The political and strategic goals and tasks in the wars, the concrete situation and the adopted understandings impose on the army unions to apply predominant offensive military actions. But in all the wars the particular armies are also imposed on to organize and conduct defensive operations. All this creates conditions for an entire development of the Bulgarian operational art.
In the army operations’ training are included activities, which gradually are enriched as quantity as well as content. Of course they do not reach the contemporary complex system but generally they consist of: taking a decision, setting tasks to the troops, operations planning, groups’ creation, interaction and ensurance, organizing and staffs’ and troops’ training.
The defensive operations are conduct in conditions when the enemy has numerical superiority in which especially in the direction of the main blow under an extreme tension and usually with the participation of the main powers and army resources. Gradually three conditional stages of the operation are formed: impediment of the taking out and the deployment of the enemy to the front part of the defence and actions for deducting the line for ensurance, conducting military operations for affecting the enemy attacks and deducting the main line of the defence, routing the enemy and restoration of the defence entireness.
Usually in the offensive operations some methods are applied for action against the defending enemy: blows to the wings for eventual encirclement of the enemy group (Moravska and Ovchepolska operations during the First World War, also the operations of Nish and Kosovo in 1944), dealing a blow towards one of the wings for closing the enemy to the natural obstacles (Kosovo operation 1915) or for joining the blow of the neighbour army (first and third army in Ljuleburgaz – Bounarhissar operation 1912) and encirclement of the defending group: blows for cutting up the enemy group (Cubadin operation 1916 – Stratcin–Kumanovo operation 1944 and Mur operation 1945).
The operations of the particular armies are conducted with a considerable retreat in the time, against different from nationality, abilities and skills enemy, in quite specific areas according to their physico-geographical characteristics. These operations are conducted from our units that are changing during the years and of course under different level of the military-theoretical understandings. But in theirs aggregate they outline the special features mainly in the operations’ conducting and preparation and they also trace the direction of the development of our operational art.
The changes of the operations’ preparation are outlined in the following: enrichment of the activities that are conducted by the commanders and staffs during the period: enhancement of the operations’ determination, enlargement and clarifying the tasks and sequence of their implementation; increasing the number and enhancement of the content of the worked out documents in the process of organizing the interaction, increasing the amount and tasks of the types ensurance and others.
The implementation of the operations is characterized by the extension of their activity and determination, with the incessant manoeuvre with powers and means, with the incessant searching of the implementation of the so set tasks, with the enlargement of the circle of the tasks solved by the branch of services, with the increase of the swing of the operations and others.
The activities of the tactical formations are analyzed in the third chapter. The objective military-technical conditions in which pass the armed struggle including after the creation of operational links, these conditions set the progress and the end of the combats and operations in direct accordance of the skills of the tactical units to organize and conduct military actions.
Thus the results of most of the army actions most of all are determined by the operations of the infantry units and formations. In their own strength the army unions do not have enough own and self-dependent powers and means, especially from the branch of services. The commanders of the particular armies besides the limited reserves that are rest in their own submission do not dispose of other troops so to have a direct influence over the progress of the military actions. In this way big responsibilities are assigned to the tactics, which is put to the severe test. In this respect a certain exception make some unions during the Second World War when armoured and cavalry formations are put under their command. The assault also predominates in the tactical links but the defensive actions are not an exceptional phenomenon.
The preparation of the combat is complicated during the years simultaneously with the enrichment of the tactical links’ structures and the introduction of new means of destruction. This fact demands the appearance and the enlargement of formation’s staff and later of the units. But it excludes all these activities and undertakings which are led in the process of preparation of the army operations.
The preparation of the combat imposes on the commanders and staffs to solve such problems as the right assignment of the goals and tasks, the direction of the main blow (region for concentration the efforts), the concept of the battle formation, organization of the interaction, ensurance and others.
Till the wars for national reunification (1912–1918) our military theory gives proof of the elements of the battle formation for offensive as well as for defensive combat. More often it includes: combat unit (first echelon), manoeuvre troops (second echelon), reserves, cavalry, aid station, army supply train and supply service. In a time of defence front position and protection are expected. The practice leads to the diversification of the composition and functions of the particular elements of the battle formation. Gradually appear and new artillery groups, anti-tank reserves, mobile detachments for surrounding, anti-aircraft defence, air reconnaissance, front detachments and others. They are imposed by the development of the means of destruction, by the ground and by the achieved level of the military-theoretical thought.
The ability of the idea of the commander about the combat to be materialized is gradually rationalized and acquired. Fixing of the efforts starts in direction of the main blow in time of assault and in the defended locality. This leads to the achievement of favourable correlation with the enemy, which in particular offensive struggles during the Second World War measures up to 3–4,5:1.
A great significance is given an account of the staffs’ and troops’ training. Tactical exercises start to be led. They are very typical for the Two.
World Wars. In them the troops train such things which are imminent to be carried out in the combat. Sometimes restricted military actions are led for improving the starting position for assault.
The conducting of the combat is improved simultaneously with the development of the means of destruction and the theory and practice for their use. Its sequence does not differ essentially from this of the activities in operation. The combat is subdivided into a certain phases which is regulated in the regulations from the beginning of the 20th century. The orderliness is gradually overcome. For example the assault starts to be conducted by direct contiguity, with groups created in advance. The character of the locality of the military actions on the Balkans lead to the assimilation of skills for assault/defence in mountain-forest land.
There are quite many critical evaluations in the monograph which most of all are due to the big distance in the time between the events and their research. They are creation of the wish other variants of the decisions and actions to be showed and also the reasons for some occasional results and missed opportunities to be revealed. All this does not depreciate the achievements of the Bulgarian military art, which for its time reaches the peak. In this respect quite significant are the last pages of the work that have collected the unprejudiced evaluations of most of the foreign military specialists.
The objective realities at the beginning of the 21st century are much more different from those from the first half of the last century when mainly our army takes part in the military actions. The character of the wars and the conflicts is changing also their scope, goals, tasks, means and methods for their conducting.of European and worldwide importance.
The upcoming admittance to membership of our country in NATO should not overthrow the identity, the traditions, the historic experience that was gained by the Bulgarian Armed Forces over the battlefields during the five wars.
In this respect our predecessors have left to us rich examples and base for our national pride.